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Question 
How have international organisations engaged with informal security actors? What lessons have 
been learned around: 
 Timing in the conflict cycle; entry points and key activities 
 Successes and challenges including those on human rights and accountability  
 
Provide a review of the evidence and pointers to case studies that illustrate what has or has not 
worked in the past to inform DFID programming in Nigeria, learn lessons and help form a position 
on whether and how to engage with informal security actors. 
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1. Summary 
Security sector reform (SSR) and Security and Justice (S&J) programmes have become a part of 
standard procedure for donors operating in fragile, failed and conflict-affected states. This rapid 
literature review sought to understand how international organisations have engaged with 
informal security actors. In the literature the term non-state actor is used more frequently than 
informal security actors and the main finding is that there is very little data available on work 
specifically with informal security actors.  
The inclusion of non-state actors in reform processes or security negotiations is repeatedly 
mentioned as desirable and means working with civil society, media and religious organisations. 
Although a common criticism of SSR in the literature is a failing to be inclusive of non-state 
actors. A multi-layered approach to community security and safety policy should consider the 
combined contributions of state, community-based, and commercial groups or structures 
(Baker,2010). Security analysts, policy makers and practitioners agree about the need to move to 
a ‘second generation’ model for SSR moving beyond traditional engagement with State judiciary 
and security organs. Although there is no accepted formula yet, one characteristic in this evolving 
landscape is a willingness to engage with non-state actors (Sedra, 2018). Jackson (2019) 
describes this shift from linear approaches to State building, working on policy and capacity of 
state security actors towards more inclusive justice where communities using customary justice 
structures are involved in diagnosis and programme design. This provides a strong rationale for 
including non-state actors although it is important to guard against the power inherent in 
traditional structures that may exclude women. 
Working with informal security actors means engaging with extra-legal non-state actors such 
as customary authorities, rebel groups, vigilantes and in urban contexts neighbourhood 
watch schemes. Caution is advised since a common assumption among donors is that informal 
actors, such as chiefs or rebel groups, cannot be engaged if they are illiberal in character or have 
a poor human rights record. In some contexts, the role and contribution of informal security 
actors is recognised as potentially positive as for example across the Lake Chad basin where 
vigilante groups play an important role in the fight against Boko Haram (International Crisis 
Group, 2017a). Informal actors are a source of local knowledge, intelligence and manpower and 
can provide more effective security than state actors, by virtue of their community roots. States 
have generally been cautious about providing informal actors with weapons, equipment and 
training. Rather, civilian and military authorities as well as their non-state backers, have provided 
some non-lethal equipment such as transport and communications equipment. 
Some successful examples of work with informal actors are highlighted and these case studies 
demonstrate: 
 The principle of involving grassroot community structures thus ensuring that activities are 
locally led 
 The process of community dialogue involving all stakeholders and marginalised groups 
 Taking time to work out with local partners what exactly they need and want to engage 
with 
 Timing an intervention appropriately to when the local community feel the need for 
external or state led support 
 Flexibility in terms of activities that may be either process related or entirely practical; 
meeting the development needs of the community and in this way improving a sense of 
security 
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 Accountability between informal actors and the community they serve, in particular 
women within that community who may be traditionally excluded or omitted from local 
justice and security systems 
 
There are also challenges to engaging with informal actors. Notably in understanding fragile and 
changing local power dynamics; engaging even those actors with poor human rights record in 
systems to deliver security. Experience shows that clarifying expectations, mandate and any 
expectations of ‘reward’ for such groups is essential from the outset. Otherwise the immediate 
and valuable contribution to peace and security they can make may be overturned at a future 
date. Disillusioned groups left to exert uncontrolled power over the community from which they 
arose may threaten security at local and national level in the future. Adequate attention to the 
reintegration elements of demobilisation programmes post conflict is essential and has been 
challenging. Gender sensitive and economically appropriate training programmes should be 
tailored to properly addressing the social and economic reintegration challenges facing ex-
vigilantes. 
The report explores lessons drawn from two substantial reviews of the evidence on outcomes of 
S&J programmes and the relationship between organisational capacity building interventions and 
improved capacity of security institutions (Denney et al, 2015; Jackson et al 2019) and from grey 
literature. The emphasis on developing a deep understanding of the local context implies that all 
stakeholder and marginalised groups would be involved through a good, inclusive approach 
to community security. An important risk flagged is that use of customary power structures at 
times facilitates the exercise of hidden power that traps the dominant, as well as the weak, in 
a web of socialised roles and behaviours (Jackson, 2019). The need to ensure inclusion of 
women and girls who suffer doubly from the violence exacted against them, and again from lack 
of justice delivered by gender-neutral systems is mentioned. No reference to the situation for 
persons with disabilities was found, but this group is especially vulnerable – unable to flee 
from attack or civil conflict; marginalised in seeking redress for physical violence or rape; and 
frequently lacking a voice in community dialogue because of stigma and negative attitudes to 
disability. 
 
2. How have international organisations engaged with 
informal security actors  
Security sector reform (SSR) programmes have become a part of the standard operating 
procedure for donors operating in fragile, failed and conflict-affected states (Sedra, 2018).  
Defined as “the process of transforming a country’s security system, so that it gradually provides 
individuals and the state with more effective and accountable security in a manner consistent 
with respect for human rights, democracy, the rule of law and the principles of good governance. 
SSR is a long-term and political process, as it goes to the heart of power relations in a country. It 
needs to be nationally driven and requires political commitment and leadership, inter-institutional 
cooperation and broad stakeholder participation to achieve the widest possible consensus.”1  
                                                   
1 EU definition in Jayasundara-Smits, 2018  
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Despite being rapidly mainstreamed over recent decades SSR programmes have a mixed record 
of success (Jackson, 2017; Sedra 2018). They are designed to build capacity of state and non-
state structures, sustain peace, uphold justice and the state of law, and deliver respect for human 
rights. The main interventions of SSR programmes are: 
 Capacity building of security sector actors 
 Development of strategic legal and policy frameworks 
 
Increasingly there is discussion among security analysts, policy makers and practitioners about 
the need to move to a ‘second generation’ model. Although there is no accepted formula yet, one 
characteristic in this evolving landscape is a willingness to engage with non-state actors, and 
the norms and structures associated with these (Sedra, 2018). 
 
In the literature the term non-state actor is used more frequently than informal security actors 
and includes both: 
 Legal and statutory actors (civil society organisations and non-governmental 
organisations for example women’s organisations, religious organisations, human rights 
organisations or media) and  
 Extra-legal and armed non-state actors (customary and traditional authorities, rebel 
groups, militias, vigilantes or criminal groups) 
 
In this rapid review of the evidence, a narrower focus on informal security actors was requested2; 
although it is noted that the boundaries between formal and informal actors are sometimes 
blurred.3 The main finding is that there is very little data available on work specifically with 
informal security actors.  
 
A review of evidence4 on the relationship between organisational capacity building interventions 
and improved capacity of security institutions and agencies to deliver, finds the inclusion of non-
state actors in reform processes or negotiations repeatedly mentioned as desirable (Denney & 
Valters, 2015:31). However, there is only a small body of high-quality literature that discusses 
capacity building in relation to such non-state actors (Denney & Valters, 2015:33). Common 
approaches to improving responsiveness among non-state actors to citizen needs, include 
training, restructuring (vetting and gender-balancing) and developing new forms of security 
provision, such as community policing, creating gender desks and decentralisation of policing 
functions. A small body of evidence attributes reductions in crime to community policing and zero 
tolerance policing methods but in some cases at the expense of accountability and political 
neutrality (Denney & Valters, 2015:31).  
 
An updated mapping5 of evidence on the outcomes of security and justice interventions (Jackson, 
Bell & Bakrania, 2019) finds that policing remains by far the most studied theme, followed by 
access to justice/legal empowerment, justice sector reform, legal reform and non-state actors. The 
                                                   
2 In Nigeria these groups outside of the formal security architecture include local neighbourhood watch schemes, 
vigilantes, politically sponsored groups, and the civilian joint task force (CJTF).  
3 Some states (e.g. Kaduna) require the registration of all vigilante groups; informal groups such as the CJTF falls 
under military command in areas of North East Nigeria 
4 149 studies of moderate to high relevance from a security sector reform (SSR) database compiled by the 
Governance and Social Development Research Centre (GSDRC) 
5 Updated from an initial assessment of the evidence in 2015; 386 documents included 
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evidence is strong for: capacity building of organisations; strategic/statutory frameworks and 
legislation; community-based approaches; and restructuring of the security and justice sector. The 
evidence base on non-state actors has also been improved to strong since 2015. The evidence 
is abundant for: the capacity of state and non-state organisations to deliver; strategic frameworks; 
confidence, trust or satisfaction on the part of citizens in providers; and roles, coordination and 
dialogue amongst organisations and agencies.  
 
This analysis is in relation to the broad cohort of non-state actors; the dataset does not contain 
studies that are specific to informal security actors. Given that these are consistently noted as 
being important in security provision this lack of information about what has been done and what 
has been achieved with non-state actors is a glaring omission from the literature; further research 
into how capacity building of non-state actors can be successful is needed (Denney & Valters, 
2015:34). The gap is even more stark in relation to informal security actors. 
 
A continuum between informal security actors, other non-state and state actors is 
sometimes described. As for example in urban contexts community-based security providers, 
such as neighbourhood watches, self-defence groups and police reserve corps, may collaborate 
with the police in providing local safety and security. Communities can contribute to their own 
need for security and safety in this way. “Community-based security providers can also build trust 
and confidence between residents and the police. However, they also often lack control and 
oversight, when they have links to alternative justice systems”. (DCAF, 2019: 4). Some scholars 
argue that contemporary vigilantism has also been influenced by past policies of U.S. and 
European promotion of community policing (Pratten, 2008). Counter insurgency and other civic 
training that is rational during one period, may unwittingly promote insecurity during a future time.  
 
The role and contribution of informal security actors is recognised as potentially positive. 
For example, across the Lake Chad basin vigilante groups play an important role in the fight 
against Boko Haram, making military operations more effective and contributing to reconnecting 
local communities with their states (International Crisis Group, 2017a). This paper provides good 
analysis of the development and growth of vigilante groups across the four countries6 around the 
Lake Chad basin, highlighting historical differences, restraints and risks and specific measures 
(such as involving women to screen other women). It does not provide any detail of how the 
vigilante groups were initially organised, equipped or trained – nor of the specific sources of 
support that is mentioned (monthly stipends and health cover) (ICG, 2017a:12). 
 
Vigilantes’ potential as a source of local knowledge, intelligence and manpower has been 
exploited by the Nigerian army (in the form of the Civilian Joint Task Force operating alongside 
the Joint Task Force) and vigilante groups (in different forms) have spread across the Lake Chad 
basin since 2013. However, their presence also raises justifiable concerns about participation in 
the war economy, abuse of human rights and unregulated access to arms. In the medium term 
the rise in number of armed civilians poses a risk to future stability. Ways to disband, formalise or 
regulate these groups must be developed if they are not to become a future source of insecurity. 
Claims for reward are challenging to address, yet vital, especially if deals are made with the Boko 
Haram militants to lay down arms.  
 
                                                   
6 Niger, Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon 
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States have been cautious about providing informal actors with weapons, equipment and 
training. Rather haphazardly, the civilian and military authorities, as well as non-state backers, 
have provided some non-lethal equipment, such as metal detectors, phones, radios and 
torchlights, as well as transportation ranging from four-wheel drive vehicles to bicycles. All have 
been wary of arming and training most vigilantes, in order to limit weapon proliferation in general 
and avoid creating what a Cameroonian officer called “uncontrollable militia”. (International Crisis 
Group, 2017a:11). Some states have exercised greater control over groups in order to mitigate 
against future contribution to insecurity: for example Niger made the most cautious use of 
vigilantes “banning civilians from manning roadblocks and bearing weapons, demanding that 
vigilantes work as an informant network with the army’s civil-military cooperation teams” 
(International Crisis Group, 2017a:9). 
Bennett et al (2014) describe Saferworld’s approach to Community Security as a process 
through which the development and security needs of a community (as expressed by community 
members from all groups) are addressed with results contributing to a more secure environment. 
There is a clear focus on improving relationships between all members of communities (including 
marginalised groups and those who have disengaged from active citizenship), behaviours within 
communities, and the relationships and behaviours of communities with authorities and 
institutions. Local improvements are linked up to subnational and national levels through 
advocacy and the inclusion of other higher-level actors in consultations and decision-making 
processes (Bennett et al, 2014:6). The overall aim is thus to replicate security gains at local level 
in other geographic locations in the same country and at the policy level. 
Conversations between communities and those providing community safety (both formal and 
informal groups) are a vital first step to building the cooperation necessary for a fear-free society. 
Including as many local stakeholders as possible is core to the approach (Bennett et al, 2014:8). 
The implication is therefore that all formal and informal security actors would be involved in 
grassroots engagement with security providers. Nevertheless, there are recognised challenges in 
adopting these principles (Bennett et al, 2014:19): 
 There may be significant doubts about transparency, accountability or impartiality of 
existing local entities 
 Some donors such as the US and the EU, require checks on individuals and groups to 
ensure they are not on a list of proscribed actors and therefore disqualified from 
participating in their funded programmes 
 
Ultimately the guidance does not take a fixed position:  
 suggesting that all social groups within the community, including marginalised groups 
who can use the community dialogue process to address their safety and security 
concerns should be involved; 
 it notes that where armed groups or gangs are present, they are likely to have a 
significant role in security and conflict dynamics and so it may be necessary to engage 
with them to have a realistic chance of improving security 
 but also finds that it may not be realistic to include them in community security working 
groups 
 and states that “if it is conflict sensitive and safe to do so, trying to develop some 
mechanism for dialogue and outreach with these actors could be important.” (Bennett et 
al, 2014:22). 
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3. Lesson Learned 
Successes 
The following limited number of case studies make a positive contribution and were highlighted in 
major reviews of evidence on the relationship between organisational capacity building 
interventions and improved capacity of security institutions and agencies to deliver (Denney et al, 
2015) and of the evidence on outcomes of security and justice interventions (Jackson et al 2019).  
1. In Afghanistan, programmes funded by the US Institute for Peace (USIP) that focused on 
training and capacity building with informal justice actors (local councils - shuras and jirgas - 
that are outside of the state’s direct control) were deemed relatively successful. Few Afghans have 
confidence in the state’s ability to deliver justice through the formal court system, so these 
councils are used to resolve disputes and conflicts in a way that local communities perceive as 
legitimate.  Activities were locally led, meaning they were informed by a good understanding of local 
power dynamics and social networks and there was an incentive to focus on long-term justice 
processes. These programmes were not deemed particularly sustainable, however, not least because 
there were simply too many elders involved in these informal justice forums who need to be trained. 
(Coburn, 2013 in Denney & Valters 2015:34). Smaller, Afghan-led initiatives have met with more 
success in increasing predictable dispute resolution, suggesting that certain types of small, 
flexible, and context-responsive programs focused on linking the formal and informal sectors can 
promote more predictable access to justice, particularly given the challenges facing formal sector 
reform (Coburn 2013:3 ). 
2. In the wake of the Arab spring (2011) and collapse of state control in some parts of Yemen a 
pilot Justice and Security Dialogue (JSD) programme was successfully introduced by USIP in two 
governorates. In Abyan and Marib there was weak state control, a high presence of transnational 
terrorist groups (Al Quaeda and others) and criminal (narcotics) networks and significant 
reconstruction and development needs. The JSDs brought together local state officials, 
tribesmen, and community representatives to begin to address security issues. (Gaston, 2015). 
Although tribes had long played a dominant role in justice and security, the community 
assessment suggested that tribes were now feeling overwhelmed by the growing complexity of 
security dynamics. Tribal leaders and citizens said they need greater government engagement 
on law enforcement, security, and justice to deal with critical issues - a level of intervention they 
had not welcomed before. (Gaston, 2015:10).  
In each pilot area recommendations made through a multi-stakeholder gathering were 
subsequently actioned. Stakeholders suggested process measures such as a developing unified 
security action plans that engage all parties (security forces, local police and law enforcement, 
justice actors, Popular Committees, and citizens). And recommended complementary practical 
measures such as state protection of oil pipelines and electricity provision; increased military 
checkpoints and meaningful state prosecution of criminals. The JSD process also empowered 
participants by linking select local representatives with national-level policymakers and actors 
who might be able to support local initiatives. These local JSD initiatives were more successful 
when complemented by outside or national level support, ranging from a national policy decision 
that supported local initiatives, to funding for local infrastructure. These were perceived as 
concrete results from the dialogue, a perception that generated more buy-in from the 
communities and further cooperation with the state (Gaston, 2015:3).  
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3.  For security sector interventions to be perceived as successful they must be seen to be 
accountable by civilian government and citizens. Accountability may be either horizontal 
(government bodies holding other parts of government to account) or vertical (citizens holding 
state institutions to account) (Denney & Valters 2015:60). As well as the presence and 
functioning of internal and external oversight mechanisms and the extent of democratic control, 
whether security actors behave in a manner accountable to citizens and up to expected 
standards of behaviour is a key indicator. In Mozambique, the expansion of community 
policing units involved the integration of non-state actors. These members were heavily relied 
on by police officers, to do both the ‘dirty’ work of the police and attempting to control crime in 
their areas. Although they did manage to reduce crime this was at the expense of increased 
police violence (Kyed, 2010 cited in Denney & Valters,2015). 
 
4. Security sector governance and reform initiatives in urban centres can contribute to more 
inclusive, safe, resilient cities. Urban populations are often rapidly changing and composed of 
diverse social groups that live closely together in densely populated areas but without close 
neighbourly relations as populations are often transient and mobile. Crime centred policing has 
proven unsuccessful in increasing safety and security in cities (DCAF, 2019). People centred 
approaches such as democratic policing, which allow community members to be consulted or 
participate in security provision, can enable municipal governments to respond more effectively 
to security needs of citizens and the state. This entails equal participation of women, gender 
minorities and marginalized groups in the population to be represented in all relevant municipal 
and national institutions responsible for managing urban safety and security, including police 
departments and defence and disaster management ministries (DCAF, 2019:4). 
5. In many countries’ domestic violence and violence against women and girls are a major 
reason for women and girls not to feel safe or secure. For example research from Nepal shows 
that Sexual and Gender Based Violence (SGBV), violence against women and girls (VAWG), 
and domestic violence (DV) are considered to be some of the main insecurity issues for 
women, with more than 80 per cent of women in rural areas facing recurring DV (Bennett et al, 
2014:8). Despite high incidence, crimes are largely unreported and unpunished because women 
are hesitant to go to the police. There are few female officers to handle cases and, furthermore, 
the conflict in Nepal has left a legacy of distrust between some communities and the police. 
Community Security meetings are organised as part of joint programming (Saferworld and 
International Alert, 2014) to bring police and communities together to discuss VAWG and plan 
how women could gain access to security and justice. The police agreed to recruit more female 
officers to handle domestic and gender-based violence cases. Community members agreed to 
educate people about their rights and what constitutes legal and illegal behaviour with regards to 
VAWG. These improvements on both the supply and demand sides of security have resulted in 
more women trusting police enough to report crimes, and women attesting to less violent 
behaviour amongst some men in the community (Bennett et al, 2014:16). 
 
Challenges 
Although there is some consensus around the need to involve informal security actors in security 
sector reform programmes there is still a level of anxiety about doing so. Concerns centre around 
the human rights records of informal actors and their lack of accountability to local structures. Some 
programming is still in large part donor lead, with design influenced by donor perceptions and 
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priorities. Weak states may rely on vigilante or informal groups to fight insurgents, but this strategy 
can be a double-edged sword perpetuating human rights abuses in the present and building the basis 
of future illegitimate yet powerful groups. 
Non-state actors that many people rely on for security are often not engaged and reforms are thus 
not as relevant to people’s lives (Baker 2006; Barnes Robinson and Valters 2015; Podder 2013; 
Sedra 2013 in Denney & Valters 2015:39). The literature indicates that capacity building approaches 
may fail – for example in improving the responsiveness of the security sector – if they do not 
acknowledge or include locally legitimate forms of security and justice provision that exist outside 
of the state. In a review of Australia’s law and justice programming, Cox et al. highlight that, while 
caution is required given concerns about the human rights records of some non-state actors, this 
should not prevent innovative and experimental engagements with such actors, in particular to 
improve their responsiveness to concerns around rights and gender equality (Cox et al 2012 cited in 
Denney & Valters 2015:39) 
A failure to understand fragile local power dynamics has made large, internationally 
sponsored programmes attempting to promote rule of law through the informal justice sector 
generally ineffective (Coburn 2013:3). These programmes face serious challenges to the model 
applied and linkages made in programming (such as through a programme Theory of Change). 
Applying a ‘one size’ model has at times been counterproductive where structures of local 
legitimacy and accountability are changed, and local actors emboldened or empowered with 
limited community oversight and control.    
In an analysis of past successes and shortcomings of past SSR programmes Jackson (2019) 
argues that peacebuilding differs from imposing hard security and should encourage bottom up 
approaches that move beyond State institutions that are often dysfunctional, illegitimate, or 
unrepresentative. The role of women is particularly important in inclusive justice and women 
should be both beneficiaries and decision makers and involved at every level of the justice sector 
(Jackson, 2019:3). More hybrid approaches encompassing a wide range of State and non-State 
actors are now found under rule of law programmes, exemplifying the broader definitions 
adopted by the international community. Caution is still necessary as ‘local ownership’ may cloud 
a truly rigorous understanding of where power lies. Marginalised groups might appear to be 
better served by programmes designed to involve grassroot structures while these still hold 
power over some groups or individuals in their ‘jurisdiction’.  For example, the use of customary 
power structures facilitates the exercise of hidden power that traps the dominant, as well as 
the weak, in a web of socialised roles and behaviours. Justice and the dispensing of justice in 
local village structures, for example, can be a part of the exercise of power in those localities. 
Local ownership may be contested. Local actors who see their power enhanced by their ability to 
dispense justice are unlikely to give up their power in order to conform to a set of international 
standards (Jackson, 2019:7). 
 
Denney (2012) describes how moving from policy in practice is still constrained by public 
perceptions of aid. A relatively successful SSR programme carried out in Sierra Leone since 
1998 by DFID engaged with state security providers almost exclusively, neglecting informal 
actors who provide approximately 80% of policing and justice services in rural Sierra Leone 
(Denney 2012:5). In doing so DFID found itself limited in its aims of comprehensively 
transforming security provision in Sierra Leone. Although chiefs play a central role in providing 
security, the liberal bureaucratic nature of DFID predisposes it to engage with the state and not 
with informal actors some of which are illiberal in character (not demonstrating acceptable 
standards of human rights). The only DFID programme that did seek to work with chiefs 
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demonstrated a lack of understanding within DFID of the complexity of the chieftaincy system 
and Sierra Leoneans’ views of it (Denney 2012:6). While understanding the importance of 
engaging with informal actors has improved: chiefs in Sierra Leone are referred to as the 
‘missing bottom of governance’ (Gaima, 2009); the ‘basic unit of local government’ (Jackson, 
2006) and chiefs themselves refer to their central purpose being law and order (Denney, 
2012:10) a clear gap between policy and practice remains. Concluding remarks seem as 
pertinent in 2019 as they were in 2012: “As aid modalities have changed to recognise that, in 
fact, aid might be more effective if it also deals with entrenched political realities that are often 
illiberal, patrimonial and patriarchal, the public relations of aid has not kept pace. While this new 
message might not seem palatable to public audiences, demonstrating why (for example) 
engaging with chiefs will improve development is important in creating the space aid agencies 
need to implement the programmes they believe will most effectively reduce poverty.” (Denney, 
2012:21) 
 
Working with vigilante groups carries inherent risks. Weak states tend to subcontract certain 
security functions to non-state actors or vigilante groups, many of which take up arms to protect 
their communities. The more fragile the state the more dependency on vigilantes is found. The 
more successful the vigilante group in fighting insurgency the harder they are to disband. 
Typically recruited from local communities, their members likely share the same ethnic or political 
identity, collective interests and perceptions of the threat, therefore raising the odds that they will 
act as local militias – potentially more powerful than state authorities – and pursue narrow ethnic 
agendas. If working with local militias is in the short-term a necessary evil, it can pave the way for 
longer-term conflict. There are some positive lessons to be learned too: vigilante groups can be 
far more effective than state actors in providing local security. They generally enjoy greater 
legitimacy by virtue of community roots, and can be more efficient in identifying, tracking and 
combating insurgents because of familiarity with local languages, geography and culture (ICG, 
2017b). 
 
The International Crisis Group (2017b) provides a comparative analysis of the experience of four 
weak, conflict affected African states7 where vigilante groups evolved as fighting forces and 
were harnessed to varied extent by the state to fight insurgency or provide civilian security. 
These are the experiences and trajectories of the Kamajors in Sierra Leone, the Zande Arrow 
Boys in South Sudan, the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) in Nigeria, and the Teso Arrow Boys 
in Uganda. Each case provides helpful lessons particularly on the challenges and risks of 
working with this section of informal security actors. The dilemmas confronting the nation state, 
are shared by international actors. Although the most desirable partner in fighting insurgency is a 
strong nation state with a monopoly over the use of violence, international actors may be 
tempted to partner a militia or vigilante group where the state alone is not effective.  In cases 
where the insurgent group has become a terrorist organisation threatening outside interests this 
appears more easily justifiable. 
 
Broad lessons, that should be applied with care to the context, emerge from this study: 
 
 Engage local leaders with influence over vigilantes with the aim of settling on finite, mutually 
acceptable objectives within an overarching counter-insurgency strategy, and ensuring they 
                                                   
7 Sudan, Uganda, Nigeria and Sierra Leone 
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provide political oversight over rank-and-file members; 
  
 Be clear upfront with vigilante leaders and foot soldiers as to what they should expect as reward 
for their efforts and compensation for any losses; 
  
 Provide vigilantes with adequate political and material support, including weapons when 
necessary, with the goal of ensuring they can pursue their objectives, thereby reducing the risk of 
extortion of resources from civilians; 
  
 Where possible, provide military oversight of, and ensure accountability for vigilantes’ abusive 
actions; 
  
 Put in place a gender-sensitive plan to demobilise vigilantes once the insurgent threat has 
receded and to help them find work in locally relevant sectors. 
 
Key learning is also that Government and donors paid less attention to reintegrating former 
fighters than to the disarmament and demobilisation phases. Administrators in Sierra Leone in 
particular acknowledge that vocational training courses were too short and did not fit economic 
needs. This has delivered a cohort of ex-militia, both leaders and foot soldiers, who remain 
aggrieved that they did not receive the support to which they were entitled. Donors can play a 
key role in providing international expertise and financial resources to help partner governments 
plan and implement sufficiently generous, locally tailored disarmament, demobilisation and 
reintegration programs. To be most effective DDR initiatives should be gender-sensitive, 
considering the particular obstacles faced by female and male vigilantes, whether they have 
fought or played supporting roles, and the social stigma they may encounter as they assume 
family responsibilities or seek employment. 
 
A growing private security sector provides security for people and property, under contract 
and for profit (Richards & Smith, 2007). Legitimate organisations, private security companies or 
private military companies, may be contracted by states to expand their own capacity. Some 
provide traditional military services though more often ‘non-lethal’ service providers supply 
training and logistical support or intelligence. In addition to these, unofficial and/or illegal 
operators such as mercenaries and neighbourhood civil defence forces may be found in the 
private security sector. Richards & Smith suggest that when effectively regulated and fully 
accountable, private companies can make a valuable contribution to the provision of security. 
However as private actors increasingly assume roles that have traditionally been the 
responsibility of the state, the activities of an uncontrolled or poorly regulated private security 
industry can present governance problems, and in transitional or post-conflict states, can act as 
an obstacle to peacebuilding and good governance. These should not be ignored by donors or 
practitioners who should assess whether the private provision of security in a country is 
problematic and consider how best to incorporate it into existing or planned security sector 
reform (SSR) programmes (Richards & Smith, 2007:10). 
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